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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
DISCRIMINATORY HIRING PRACTICES DUE TO
ARREST RECORDS - PRIVATE REMEDIES
I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Bureau of Investigation has estimated that in 1969 there
were 7% million arrests made in the United States, exclusive of traffic
violations.1 In a substantial number of cases, the charges against the indi-
vidual were either dropped or the subsequent trial resulted in an acquittal.2
Theoretically, such a disposition should resolve the matter as far as the
individual is concerned. Indeed, in the Anglo-American legal tradition,
we cannot even say that the individual has been vindicated, since in theory
he was presumed innocent from the outset. Unfortunately, the realities of
life in our society often have little in common with the high ideals of our
forefathers and legal theorists. The limited purpose of this Comment is
an attempt to bring reality a slight step closer to theory in one important
area of daily life.
Present day communications and "modern" police investigatory pro-
cedures have combined to produce a situation wherein the arrested in-
dividual has a "record" 3 on file in at least one, and probably several law
enforcement data centers.4 In some instances, this record may only in-
dicate that the person was arrested. In other cases, the final disposition
may be noted. However, in the latter case, even an exoneration has
little, if any, favorable influence on the attitude of the police,5 the govern-
ment6 or the private sector of the community7 toward this individual.
This attitude, which we as a nation take toward anyone who has had
1. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE
UNITED STATES: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS - 1969, at 31 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as CRIME REPORTS]. It should be pointed out that this figure represents an estimate
of the number of arrests. It does not represent the number of persons arrested since
an individual may be arrested more than once.
2. CRIME REPORTS, supra note 1, at 102. The F.B.I. report represented that
out of an estimated population of 66,155,000, a total of only 2,402,979 people were held
for prosecution. Of the latter group, an average of 15.9 per cent were acquitted or
the charges were dismissed. When broken down further, it is seen that the acquittal
or discharge rate is higher for violent crimes (28.3 per cent) than for property crimes
(12.7 per cent).
3. The terms "record" and "arrest record" are used interchangeably, and for
the purposes of this Comment will refer only to a record containing arrests with
no convictions.
4. All local law enforcement agencies are requested to forward their data per-
taining to, among other things, arrests, fingerprinting and photographing, to the F.B.I.
5. The attitude of the F.B.I. was expressed by its director when, referring to
the Bureau's data concerning persons convicted of crime as well as those merely
arrested, stated that there exists "a criminal army of six million individuals who
have been arrested and fingerprinted . . . ." (Emphasis added.) Hess & LePoole,
Abuse of the Record of Arrest Not Leading to Conviction, 13 CRIME & DELINQUENCY
494, 496 (1967).
6. See L. Zeitz & G. Borkow, Barrier to the Employment of Former Offenders:
Local Governmental Job Applications, January 4, 1971 (unpublished manuscript in
Georgetown University Law Center, Institute of Criminal Law and Procedure).
7. See Hess & LePoole, supra note 5.
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"'police contact," places the individual with a mere arrest record at a
tremendous societal disadvantage.
Perhaps the greatest inequity caused by arrest records is discrimina-
tion in employment practices. In no other private area are such records
used so extensively and with such devastating results. Recent surveys have
demonstrated more than amply the widespread use of arrest records in
the making of employment decisions.8 It is interesting to note that while
there have been several recent commentaries in this area, none have been
directed at potential private remedies which would enable the individual
to vindicate his rights in the courts.9 The theories presented in this
Comment are not intended to be exhaustive. Notably, expungement of
the record will not be treated because of its general ineffectiveness.' 0
Instead, several of the more promising theories have been dealt with in
order to provide a practical guide in an effort to bring about the much
needed changes in the law.
As a result of the widespread use of arrest records in making em-
ployment decisions, it will be presumed, for purposes of this Comment,
that there has been such usage and discrimination on that basis. The proof
of discrimination will vary in each case, but the arguments advanced in
an effort to provide the courts with the necessary tools to void that dis-
crimination will vary only to take into account the nature of the employer.
II. GOVERNMENTAL DISCRIMINATION
As an employer," the federal government has strived to eradicate
the more common forms of discrimination. 12 By so doing, it has become
8. See, e.g., RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION (1963); Hess &
LePoole, supra note 5; Schwartz & Skolnick, Two Studies of Legal Stigma, 10
SOCIAL PROBLEMS 133 (1962) ; Note, Discrimination on the Basis of Arrest Records,
56 CORNELL L. REV. 470 (1971).
9. See, e.g., Comment, Criminal Records of Arrest and Conviction: Expunge-
ment from the General Public Access, 3 CALIF. W.L. REV. 121 (1967) ; Comment,
Guilt by Record, 1 CALIF. W.L. REV. 126 (1965) ; Note, supra note 8.
It seems to be generally accepted that the problem of discrimination in
employment based on arrest records should be the subject of legislative and notjudicial action. However, it is this writer's opinion that the problem is far too
pressing to await legislative initiative. Legislative action is sorely needed and, if it
comes, would be welcomed. However, it is submitted that in the interim those who
bear the brunt of this discrimination should not be forced to accept the consequences
of legislative abstention.
10. Expungement of an arrest record entails an action brought by the individual
to have the record destroyed. Expungement is a statutory remedy provided only in
a minority of states. RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION 637-38 (1963).
Generally, these statutes provide for expungement of conviction records, id. at 638,
and therefore are not applicable to the type of record discussed in this Comment.
Further, this remedy while potentially useful has not proved effective in actual
practice. See Booth, The Expungement Myth, 38 Los ANGELES B. BULL. 161 (1963).
For further discussion of expungement, see Comment, Criminal Records of Arrest
and Conviction: Expungement from the General Public Access, 3 CALIF. W.L. REV.
121 (1967).
11. The federal government employs approximately 2,845,000 people in non-
military positions. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT
AND EARNINGS 59 (1970).
12. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 7151 to 7154 (1970).
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a leader in creating employment opportunities for minority segments of
the society. However, its position on the use of arrest records is unclear.
The Civil Service Commission, while only inquiring into past conzictions,
does ask the job applicant whether charges are pending against him at
the time of his application.' 8 Furthermore, the Commission's question-
naire warns the applicant not to give false information upon penalty ofjob denial or forfeiture, and possible criminal prosecution. 14  Viewing
this questionnaire as a whole, it would appear that an arrest record is
not a serious impediment to federal employment. However, this may not
be the case.
Notwithstanding the foregoing questionnaire, federal employment is
conditioned upon an investigation of the applicant for "security" reasons.15
At the very least, this investigation must consist of a fingerprint check
with the F.B.I. and appropriate local law enforcement agencies. 16 There-
fore, while the Civil Service Commission's questionnaire may not reveal
an applicant's arrest record, the subsequent investigation most assuredly
would.' 7 The use made of this information, ostensibly to determine whether
the applicant presents a threat to the national security, is largely within
the discretion of the hiring agency.' 8 However, under the guidance of
Mr. Justice Douglas, 19 recent cases have begun to limit the powers of the
government qua employer. These cases and their impact will be discussed
in a later section.
While the federal government's employment practices are open to
question, those of the various state and local governments appear to be
little better than abusive. Disregarding the various discretionary licens-
ing statutes in the several states,20 a recent study revealed that approxi-
mately fifty per cent of the states and seventy-five per cent of the local
governments surveyed began their questioning with respect to the appli-
13. U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMM'N, PERSONAL QUALIFICATIONS STATEMENT 
-
FORM 171, Question 29 (1968) (emphasis added).
14. Id.
15. The President has promulgated regulations which provide that federal em-ployment is conditioned upon investigation of the applicant. The investigation mustinclude a check with the F.B.I. and other appropriate agencies. If any informationdevelops indicating that employment may not be "clearly consistent with national
security," a full field investigation must be conducted. Exec. Order No. 10,450,3 C.F.R. 936 (1953). But see Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956), wherein theCourt ruled that the Government must demonstrate a connection between the acts ofthe employee and the "national security" in order to dismiss an employee.
16. Exec. Order No. 10,450, 3 C.F.R. 936 (1953).
17. See Scott v. Macy, 349 F.2d 182, 183 (D.C. Cir. 1965), wherein the courtfound that the subsequent investigation revealed the appellant's arrest record.18. However, restrictions have been imposed on such agencies. See Cole v.Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956) ; notes 105 to 130 and accompanying text infra.
19. See notes 105 to 110 and accompanying text infra.
20. Such statutes provide for fingerprint checks of applicants and generally con-
cern licensing of physicians, pharmacists, and others, but may also include: public
service vehicle operators, CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 14-44 (1970) ; employees ofcheck cashing agencies, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:15A-3 (1970) ; employees of alcoholicbeverage manufacturers and wholesalers, N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONTROL LAW §§ 103(6),104(9) (MeKinney 1970) ; and private detectives, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 14(Supp. 1971).
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cants' "criminal records," and inquired into previous arrests.2 1 Several
states do not provide for any explanation of the arrests by the applicant ;22
others request additional information. 23 Questions concerning prior arrests
would not be asked if the employer did not think them pertinent in
evaluating applicants' moral character and job qualifications. Unless it is
used to discriminate among applicants, this type of question is without
purpose. Accordingly, the mere fact that a particular applicant has an
arrest record places him at a disadvantage when compared with an appli-
cant, equal in other respects, but without a record. 24
With this in mind, it may be appropriate first to discuss an argument
that can be advanced against the retention of arrest records by law en-
forcement agencies. The acceptance of this argument by the courts would
prevent both governmental and private discrimination at the same time.
A. The Right of Privacy
It is submitted that a cogent argument may be advanced which would
indirectly prevent the type of discrimination with which we are concerned
herein, before it has an opportunity to occur. Using the often-discussed
right of privacy, the maintenance of an arrest record of an individual who
has never been convicted25 can be prevented or severely curtailed. As
with many other legal problems, there are several levels at which the right
of privacy argument may be applied. At one level, the actual maintenance
and possession of the file by law enforcement agencies may be challenged.
On a different level is an attack aimed at the divulgence of the file's con-
tents to prospective employers, governmental or private. Both of these
potential avenues of attack will be examined below in order to determine
their feasibility. It should be noted, however, that neither of these argu-
ments strike at the problem of job discrimination per se; rather, they
operate indirectly to alleviate discrimination by removing the basis for it.
1. The Maintenance of Arrest Records
The maintenance of an arrest record concerning an individual operates
to deprive that individual of numerous societal benefits.26 From a law
enforcement point of view, several reasons may be advanced to support
21. The L. Zeitz & G. Borkow survey indicated that approximately fifty per
cent of the states have arrest-oriented applications, while approximately seventy-five
to eighty per cent of the local governments (city, county, etc.) surveyed have such
applications. Furthermore, a state with a conviction orientation did not seem to
influence the orientation of the local governments within that state. Generally, the
arrest-oriented states were centered in the south and west, while the conviction-
oriented states were centered in the northeast and north central regions of the
country. See note 6 supra.
22. These states do not give the applicant a chance to explain the circumstances
of the arrest. L. Zeitz & G. Borkow, supra note 6.
23. Id.
24. See Hess & LePoole, supra note 5.
25. See note 3 supra.
26. See notes 4 to 8 and accompanying text supra.
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the retention and use of such records.2 7 However, when an arrest does
not result in a conviction, these reasons become questionable. Basically,
the maintenance of arrest records constitutes a situation wherein the benefit
to be gained by society - aid to law enforcement officials in their attempt
to control crime - must be examined in light of the damage done to the
individual.28 In the situation under consideration, a substantial part of
the damage is the serious impediment faced by a large segment 29 of the
society in obtaining employment. It may be appropriate, therefore, to
attempt to prevent the maintenance of these files completely.30
It is clear that certain amendments to the United States Constitution
were drafted to protect definitive aspects of what may generally be termed
the individual's right of privacy. For example, the third amendment limits
the quartering of troops in private homes; the fourth amendment limits
the government's search and seizure power; and the fifth amendment
grants the privilege not to be forced to incriminate oneself. It is also
clear that the ninth amendment recognizes rights, not enumerated in the
first eight amendments, which are retained by the people.31 What is not
clear is the extent to which the ninth amendment will be used as a basis
for protecting and enlarging the right of privacy.3 2 The ninth amendment,
27. Among these reasons are the following: (1) arrest records facilitate ease
of apprehension and detection in future crimes; (2) the records are needed by police
authorities so that they can keep track of persons who have had police contact; and
(3) many of those acquitted are actually guilty, but were released on technicalities,
and therefore, are criminals and must be watched. See also Menard v. Mitchell, 430
F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
28. Not only is the individual with an arrest record excluded from a large
segment of employment, he is usually one of the first persons brought under sus-
picion when a crime is committed in his area. Normally, the police carry a book
containing names and addresses of persons in their area with arrest and conviction
records. Also, in the event of a later conviction, an individual's arrest record is often
used in the "presentencing report" submitted to the judge. See N.Y. CODE CRIM.
PROC. § 942-a (McKinney 1958); ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS, THE PRESENTENcE REPORT 11 (1965). See also Menard v. Mitchell, 430
F.2d 486, 490-91 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Note, supra note 8.
29. In 1969, based upon a population of 133,028,000, a total of 5,576,705 arrests
were reported. CRIME REPORTS, supra note 1, at 118. It is estimated that for the
entire country in 1969 there were 72 million arrests. Id. at 31. One commentator
estimated that there is one new offender in every eight arrests. See Hess & LePoole,
supra note 5, at 494. Extrapolating these figures, it becomes apparent that in 1969,
approximately 937,500 of the 7y2 million had never been arrested previously. In
other words, about 937,500 new arrest records are being added to police files each
year and accordingly, that number will be added each year to those who will be
burdened by the discrimination discussed herein.
30. While the Supreme Court has held that the government cannot use informa-
tion or evidence obtained from or as the result of an illegal arrest, see, e.g., Davis
v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969), some courts have been reluctant in their approach
to expungement of records of illegal arrests, even when the arrest was without
probable cause, or was used to harrass or punish or for other illegal objectives. Cf.
Wheeler v. Goodman, 306 F. Supp. 58 (W.D.N.C. 1969), vacated, 401 U.S. 987
(1971).
31. U.S. CONST. amend. IX, provides:
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people.
32. See Dixon, The Griswold Penumbra: Constitutional Charter For An
Expanded Law Of Privacy?, 64 MICH. L. REV. 197 (1965) ; Emerson, Nine Justices
in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MICH. L. REV. 219 (1965) ; Kauper, Penumbras, Peri-
pheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental and Things Forgotten: The Griswold
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therefore, becomes an indispensible aspect of any attempt to espouse a
privacy doctrine.
Prior to Griswold v. ConnecticUt,'3 the Supreme Court had been
given few opportunities34 to elucidate the meaning of the ninth amend-
ment. In Griswold, the Court was faced with a challenge to a Connecticut
statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives. After the aiding and abetting
convictions of the director and medical director of a birth control clinic
were upheld by the Connecticut courts, the Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari, allowing the defendants to assert the rights of their clients. The
Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas, struck down the statute as
violative of the right of marital privacy.35 Mr. Justice Douglas found this
right of privacy to be implicit in the "penumbra" of the first, third, fourth,
fifth and ninth amendments.3 6 However, he failed to give a detailed and
certain interpretation to the ninth amendment at that time.3 7
On the other hand, Mr. Justice Goldberg made a detailed analysis of
the ninth amendment in his concurring opinion in Griswold.3 8 Justice
Goldberg read the ninth amendment as signifying that the Bill of Rights
was not to be read restrictively. Rather, other rights exist which are "so
rooted [in the traditions and conscience of our people] as to be ranked
as fundamental."3 9 These fundamental rights are preserved by the ninth
amendment, and then applied as constitutional principles through the due
process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 40 Finally, Justice
Goldberg concluded that the right of privacy was a fundamental right,
and could be invoked in Griswold.
With the exception of the two dissents, 41 the various interpretations
given the ninth amendment by the Justices in Griswold all seemed to
recognize the ability to distill a general right of privacy from the Con-
stitution or, at least, to espouse a doctrine which, through the first, third,
fourth, fifth and ninth amendments, would have extensive constitutional
underpinnings. 42  However, the general right of privacy, presaged in
Case, 64 MICH. L. REV. 235 (1965) ; Kelley, The Uncertain Renaissance of the Ninth
Amendment, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 814 (1966) ; Kutner, The Neglected Ninth Amend-
ment: The "Other Rights" Retained by the People, 51 MARQ. L. REV. 121 (1967)
Sutherland, Privacy in Connecticut, 64 MICH. L. REV. 283 (1965).
33. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
34. Other cases interpreting the ninth amendment prior to Griswold were, Roth
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) ; United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S.
75 (1947); Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 306 U.S. 118
(1939) ; Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
35. 381 U.S. at 485-86.
36. Id. at 484.
37. While Mr. Justice Douglas did not extensively analyze the ninth amendment
in Griswold, he did so in the later case of Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323(1966). In Osborn, Mr. Justice Douglas construed the ninth amendment as being a
rule of construction which allows the derivation of unenumerated rights from the
implicit bases of the enumerated rights. 385 U.S. at 352-53. See Kutner, supra note 32.
38. 381 U.S. at 488-93.
39. Id. at 493.
40. Id.
41. Dissenting in Griswold were Justices Black and Stewart. 381 U.S. at 507.
42. See Kutner, supra note 32; 15 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 126 (1966).
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Griswold and viewed by many as the beginning of a much needed con-
stitutional doctrine,48 was short-lived.
Only two years subsequent to Griswold, the Court, through Mr.
Justice Stewart,4 4 handed down the decision in Katz v. United States.'"
In Katz, the Court held that the use of electronic eavesdropping devices
to intercept the defendants' telephone conversations in a public telephone
booth violated the search and seizure provisions of the fourth amend-
ment.46 To arrive at this holding, the Court chose to abandon the tres-
pass doctrine' 7 in search and seizure cases, and to implement in its stead
a determination of whether or not the Government had violated the
defendants' reasonable expectation of privacy. 48 In the words of the
Court, "the fourth amendment protects people not places."' 4
However, in Katz, Mr. Justice Stewart took the opportunity to restate
his position on a general right of privacy. He stated for the Court that:
The Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitu-
tional "right to privacy." That Amendment protects individual privacy
against certain kinds of governmental intrusion .... But the protection
of a person's general right to privacy ...is . ..left largely to the
law of the individual States.50
As in many areas of constitutional law, it appears as though the first
steps taken in espousing the privacy and ninth amendment doctrines
have been but erratic gestures. Faced, on the one hand with a need for a
new privacy doctrine in Griswold, and, on the other, with the fear of
that doctrine swallowing up provisions of the Bill of Rights, the Court
chose to back away from the initial probe it had made in Griswold.
However, even under Katz, it may remain possible to establish a strong
argument against the maintenance of arrest records.
Katz appears to indicate that in order to have an invasion of privacy
which rises to a constitutional plane, there must be a breach of an
enumerated constitutional provision.5 ' Further, Katz teaches that the
fourth amendment's search and seizure provisions are breached only by
governmental intrusion upon an individual's reasonable expectation of
privacy. Admittedly, when an individual is arrested there can be no
reasonable expectation of privacy since the individual's rights must yield
to public interests. Hence, the original compilation of arrest data does not
amount to a constitutional violation. However, it cannot seriously be
doubted that the government compiles data when an arrest is made that it
could not otherwise obtain; upon arrest, the suspect is compelled to dis-
43. See note 32 supra.
44. See note 41 supra.
45. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
46. Id. at 350-53.
47. Id. at 353.
48. Id. at 351, 353.
49. Id. at 351.
50. Id. (emphasis added and footnotes omitted).
51. Id. at 350 nn.4 & 5.
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close much information which we may assume would not ordinarily be
volunteered by an individual to the government. It is submitted that
after the charges have been dropped or the individual acquitted, there
is a reasonable expectation of a return to normalcy, and from that point
oil governmental maintenance of an arrest record constitutes a continuing
violation of the individual's privacy. In this way, the maintenance of the
record becomes violative of the individual's right to privacy under the
fourth and ninth amendments.
This approach seems to have been taken by the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Puerto Rico in the case of Kalish v. United
States.52 In Kalish, the defendant had been fingerprinted and photographed
following an arrest for violation of a Selective Service regulation.53 Later,
he entered the military service and the charges were dropped. On a
motion to order expungement of the arrest records, the court ordered the
record expunged, noting the severe detriment to the individual and the
lack of public good derived from the maintenance of such records. The
court held that the continued maintenance of the record constituted "an
unwarranted attack upon his character and reputation and violates his
right of privacy: it violates his dignity as a human being. ' 5 4
The Kalish case and other recent decisions5" have recognized the
tremendous impact that criminal arrest records may have upon the in-
dividual. Several early cases, intimating that such records lead to no
adverse effects, have not been followed.5 6 This new awareness of a future
detriment to the individual, combined with the slowly evolving concept
of privacy and including perhaps the search and seizure requirements
of the fourth amendment, has given the individual a strong weapon for
halting discriminatory hiring practices before they can begin.
2. Disclosure of Arrest Records - Breach of Confidentiality
Perhaps less drastic than the preceding remedy, at least from a law
enforcement point of view, is an individual's remedy for breach of the
confidentiality of arrest records. Most statutes authorizing the mainte-
nance of arrest records fall within one of several general categories. At
one extreme are the statutes providing for the confidentiality of the record
with civil remedies for breach of that confidentiality ;517 while at the other
extreme, there are statutes that make arrest records public.5 8 Somewhere
in-between are the statutes which provide for confidentiality without civil
52. 271 F. Supp. 968 (D.P.R. 1967). Cf. Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486
(D.C. Cir. 1970).
53. 271 F. Supp. at 969.
54. Id. at 970 (emphasis added).
55. See, e.g., Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Morrow v.
District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728 (D.C. Cir. 1969) ; United States v. McLeod, 385
F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1967) ; Vheeler v. Goodman, 306 F. Supp. 58, 66 (W.D.N.C. 1969),
vacated, 401 U.S. 987 (1971).
56. See, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 1932).
57. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CoDE ANN. § 72.50.140 (Supp. 1970).
58. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. §§ 4-134, 4-135 (1966).
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remedy;59 those which make no statutory provision whatsoever as to
arrest records, but do as to conviction records ;60 and those states without
any statutory provision at all. 61 None of these statutes have provided
the individual with adequate protection, and in general, the "confidential"
files have been easily accessible to prospective employers,62 governmental
or private. Because of the widespread abuse of these records, the avail-
ability of a private action in the event of their disclosure to unauthorized
persons would provide a powerful deterrent compatible with the needs
of both law enforcement agencies and the individual.63
An examination of the various statutes makes it apparent that they
fall within one of two classes: (1) those providing for confidentiality;
and (2) those making no provision with respect to confidentiality.64 For
the time being, discussion of the former category will be postponed, and
the statutes falling within the latter will be examined more closely.
Typical of a non-confidential statute is the federal enactment which
provides for disclosure of conviction and arrest records to certain agen-
cies and "other institutions." 65 At the very least, this statute authorizes
the divulgence of any records to other governmental agencies - including
potential employer agencies. 66 Such a practice, however, may cause this
type of statute to be constitutionally infirm.
Initially, when a suspect is arrested, his rights must be subordinated
to those of society, and he must allow the compilation of the material
which then becomes his arrest record.6 7 However, when the charges
are dropped or the individual is acquitted, the law enforcement agencies
must have a valid reason for retaining the records. That is, in order to
comport with equal protection standards, the statute or practice authoriz-
ing the maintenance and retention of arrest records must have a purpose
which is at least reasonably related to the differentiation of those with
and those without records.68 Furthermore, while a practice such as this
59. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 8511, 8518 (1953).
60. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 534(a)(2) (1970).
61. Most states fall within this latter category in that they have no statutory
provisions as to confidentiality. See Note, supra note 8.
62. See Hess & LePoole, supra note 5; Comment, Guilt by Record, 1 CALIF.
W.L. REV. 126 (1965) ; Note, supra note 8; 49 TEXAS L. REv. 141 (1970).
63. The argument that these records are confidential and are not released to
other than authorized officials is sometimes advanced to forestall such a remedy. This,
however, does not comport with the facts. See Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486(D.C. Cir. 1970) ; Comment, Criminal Records of Arrest and Conviction: Expunge-
ment from the General Public Access, 3 CALIF. W.L. REv. 121 (1967).
64. This latter group includes those states having no statutory provision since
the same arguments would apply to their agency policies.
65. 28 U.S.C. § 534(a) (2) (1970) authorizes dissemination of F.B.I. records
to "authorized officials of the Federal Government, the States, cities, and penal and
other institutions." (Emphasis added.) The Attorney General has taken the position
that release of the records to government officials, government agencies in general,
most banks, insurance companies, and railroad police is authorized. 28 C.F.R.
§ 0.85(b) (1971).
66. 28 C.F.R. § 0.85(b) (1971).
67. See text accompanying notes 51 & 52 supra.
68. See, e.g., Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S.
582 (1961) ; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). While the fifth amendment
[VOL. 17
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may be supported by several reasonable purposes, 69 in actual operation
it can not be predicted upon one which is otherwise impermissible.7"
A purpose which conflicts with another constitutional mandate would
necessarily be impermissible.71 In the present context, the use of arrest
records by governmental agencies for employment purposes is, as will
be shown later, a denial of due process. 72 Therefore, while the retention
and use of the records for crime control may be upheld as consonant
with the equal protection clause,73 if in actual operation the data is dis-
closed to outsiders for use in employment decisions, such use could not
be upheld since the objective would be a denial of due process and hence
impermissible.7 4 Accordingly, the statutes providing for the maintenance
of records can withstand an equal protection attack only if they are limited
to use in crime control. It becomes incumbent upon a court, therefore,
in construing such a statute, to make a determination that the records
must be kept confidential and disclosed only for crime control purposes.
Thus, those statutes which do not provide for confidentiality must be
construed as so providing. Since all of these statutes must be construed
as providing for confidentiality or, expressly make such a provision, there
is now only one type of statute, as far as the present situation is con-
cerned, while previously there were two. In this single group, each
statute, either expressly or by necessary judicial gloss, provides that
arrest records must be kept confidential.
For the individual, such a determination without more would be
meaningless since these statutes have been constantly abused even when
they specifically provide for confidentiality.75 Accordingly, it is necessary
to fashion a remedy whereby the individual's rights may be vindicated.
One potential remedy is an action in tort for invasion of privacy. At the
outset, it should be noted that such a remedy would not directly prevent
disclosure or discrimination. Rather, the threat of a civil action for
damages against the disclosing individual would have the effect of deterring
disclosure and, thereby, preventing discrimination indirectly.
7
has no equal protection clause, the Court nonetheless has held that the federal govern-
ment must comply with equal protection. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
69. See Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486, 489 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ; DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 8522 (1953) (indicating that the particular chapter should be con-
strued liberally to effectuate prompt identification and apprehension of criminal
offenders).
70. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); cf. Norwalk CORE v.
Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968) ; Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F.
Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967).
71. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). See also Developments
in the Law - Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1081 (1969).
72. See notes 105 to 130 and accompanying text infra.
73. This is not to say that such a purpose is necessarily valid.
74. See note 71 supra.
75. See notes 3 to 8 and accompanying text supra.
76. One added benefit of this type action is that it would inhibit disclosure to
both governmental and private employers, since the action is against the official
divulging the file and would deter all divulgencies by him. As will be seen later
(text accompanying notes 143 to 159 infra), the remedies for private discrimination
are, at this time, practically nonexistent.
COMMENTS
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The development of the law of privacy as a tort nas its historical
origins in a famous article written in 1890 by Samuel D. Warren and
Louis D. Brandeis. 77 There, the authors reviewed several earlier cases
and concluded that the results reached in those cases were premised upon
the principle of individual privacy - the right to be left alone.78 There-
after, this privacy rationale was slowly adopted by the courts until there
evolved four distinct subclassifications of the tort of invasion of privacy.
79
One of these subclassifications is the public disclosure of private facts."0
Generally, a tort action for public disclosure of private facts must
meet two requirements. First, the disclosure must concern "private"
facts."' The type of facts that are considered private, however, is not
entirely clear. For instance, it is generally agreed that facts which con-
stitute public record are not "private" facts.8 2 Conversely, it has been
held that medical records,83 medical facts,8 4 indebtedness8 5 and facts of
this nature are "private." Arrest records, as examined previously, must
be kept confidential.8 6 As such, it is submitted that they fall within the
class of protectable "private" facts.
The second general requirement of the action is that the disclosure
itself must be public in nature.87 Thus, it has been held that there is no
invasion of privacy where the defendant informs the plaintiff's employer
that the plaintiff is delinquent in a debt,88 or where a bank privately
discloses the plaintiff's financial status.8 9 Presumably, the basis for the
public disclosure requirement is that the tort protects the plaintiff's privacy
and there is no invasion of that privacy without general publicity. How-
ever, any rigid doctrinaire formula mechanically applied breeds only con-
77. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
78. Id.
79. For an extensive treatment of the tort of invasion of privacy, see Prosser,
Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960).
80. See, e.g., Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931) ; Cason v.
Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So. 2d 243 (1945) ; Trammell v. Citizens News Co., 285 Ky.
529, 148 S.W.2d 708 (1941).
81. See, e.g., Reed v. Orleans Parish Schoolboard, 21 So. 2d 895 (La. App.
1945) ; Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942).
82. See, e.g., Bell v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 402 S.W.2d 84
(Ky. 1966) (delinquency in taxes) ; Meetze v. Associated Press, 230 S.C. 330, 95
S.E.2d 606 (1956). But see Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931)
(some unsavory incidents in plaintiff's life, including facts derived from a murder
trial wherein the present plaintiff was the accused, made into a movie).
83. Munzer v. Blaisdell, 183 Misc. 773, 49 N.Y.S.2d 915 (Sup. Ct. 1944), aff'd,
269 App. Div. 970, 58 N.Y.S.2d 359 (1945).
84. Simonsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 224, 177 N.W. 831 (1920).
85. Pack v. Wise, 155 So. 2d 909 (La. App. 1964).
86. See notes 67 to 74 and accompanying text supra.
87. See Patton v. Jacobs, 118 Ind. App. 358, 78 N.E.2d 789 (1948); Voneye v.
Turner, 240 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1951) ; Prosser, supra note 79. But see Gouldman-
Taber Pontiac, Inc. v. Zerbst, 96 Ga. App. 48, 99 S.E.2d 475 (1957), rev'd on other
grounds, 213 Ga. 682, 100 S.E.2d 881 (1957); Pack v. Wise, 155 So. 2d 909 (La.
App. 1964); Simonsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 224, 177 N.W. 831 (1920) ; Munzer
v. Blaisdell, 183 Misc. 773, 49 N.Y.S.2d 915 (Sup. Ct. 1944), aft'd, 269 App. Div. 970,
58 N.Y.S.2d 359 (1945).
88. Voneye v. Turner, 240 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1951); Hawley v. Professional
Credit Bureau, 345 Mich. 500, 76 N.W.2d 835 (1956).
89. Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 367 P.2d 284 (1961).
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tempt for the: legal system. The true basis for this tort, as for any tort,
is the damage done to the individual. In the present context, the damage
done is real and substantial. Disclosure of arrest records to prospective
employers can and does result in the loss of employment opportunities
for the individual. 90 Basically, it becomes a matter of degree, and while
the extent of the disclosure may be relevant in determining damages, it
should not preclude recovery entirely. 91 In fact, several cases have recog-
nized that the amount of publicity is not the important question; rather,
the potential for harm involved in the disclosure is considered to be
the yardstick.
These cases have not upheld the distinction between general public
disclosure of private facts and disclosure to only a few persons. For in-
stance, in Simonsen v. Swenson,92 the court noted that disclosure by a
physician to a hotel owner that a guest at the hotel had a "highly con-
tagious disease" constituted an invasion of privacy unless the doctor
could show sufficient legal justification.93 In a case more closely analogous
to the problem presently under discussion, the court held that divulgence
to an employer that one of his employee's owed the defendant a debt and
would not pay constituted an invasion of privacy. 94 In that case, the court
implicitly rejected the public disclosure requirement and the rationale
behind it, noting that the plaintiff had been damaged irrespective of the
lack of general publicity.95 In Munzer v. Blaisdell,9 6 the defendant, a
hospital superintendent, disclosed the plaintiff's medical records. In that
case, as in the present situation, a state statute provided for the confiden-
tiality of such records, but did not provide for a private remedyf 7 The
court found that the plaintiff had stated a cause of action, holding:
[W]here a . . . duty is imposed by statute, a breach of that duty will
give rise to a cause of action for damages . .. and . . . if the statute
itself does not provide a remedy, the common law wtill furnish it.98
90. See note 8 supra.
91. In a somewhat related subclass of invasion of privacy - intrusion upon
seclusion or into private affairs - the extent of publicity is of no consequence. Thus,
the defendant was found liable for prying into the status of plaintiff's bank accountin Zimmerman v. Wilson, 81 F.2d 847 (3d Cir. 1936). In MacDaniel v. Atlanta
Coca-Cola Bottling. Co., 60 Ga. App. 92, 2 S.E.2d 810 (1939), the defendant wasfound to have committed this tort by listening to the plaintiff's conversations via ahidden microphone. See also LaCrone v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 114 Ohio App. 299,
182 N.E.2d 15 (1961) ; Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 206 A.2d 239 (1964) ;Frey v. Dixon, 141 N.J. Eq. 481, 58 A.2d 86 (1948). These cases amply illustrate
that the plaintiff's privacy may be invaded despite the lack of widespread publicity.92. 104 Neb. 224, 177 N.W. 831 (1920).93. In Simonsen, the physician was able to show sufficient legal reason to invade
the patient's privacy.94. Pack v. Wise, 155 So. 2d 909 (La. App. 1964). A similar conclusion was
reached in Gouldman-Taber Pontiac,. Inc. v. Zerbst, 96 Ga. App. 48, 99 S.E.2d 475(1957) and Quina v. Robert's, 16 So. 2d 558 (La. App. 1944).
95. 155 So. 2d at 914.
96. 183 Misc. 773, 49 N.Y.S.2d 915 (Sup. Ct. 1944), aff'd, 269 App. Div: 970,
58 N.Y.S.2d 359 (1945).
97. Id. at 774, 49 N.Y.S.2d at 916.
98. Id. at 775, 49 N.Y.S.2d at 917 (emphasis added). It should be noted that itis not unusual to find courts taking a position similar to the one taken in the Muncer
case. For instance, many negligence cases are proved by showing the breach of a
COMUMENTS
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In State ex rel. Mavity v. Tyndall,99 the court was asked to expunge
the arrest records of an individual who had been acquitted. Pursuant to
statutory authorization, the records were maintained to facilitate crime
control and suspect identification. 00 While the court upheld the consti-
tutionality of the statute, it stated that any use of the record not con-
sonant with the statute - specifically, posting of photographs in a "rogues'
gallery" - would constitute an actionable invasion of privacy. 10'
Lastly, in McGovern v. Van Riper,10 2 the court held that the right
of privacy is a natural law concept protected by the state constitution.
The court concluded that at least prior to any conviction, arrest records
could not be disseminated or disclosed unless the individual became a
fugitive from justice. 108 Such dissemination was held to serve no useful
public need, and to constitute an invasion of privacy which could be
redressed by the court. 04
These cases make it clear that the wrong to be redressed is the in-
vasion of the plaintiff's privacy. Such a wrong cannot be premised upon
the inflexible application of legal dogma. The true basis for the relief
should be the unauthorized disclosure, taking into account the potential
for damage created by that disclosure. In this way, if the extent of the
disclosure is pertinent to the damage sustained, it may be considered in
assessing the amount of damages recoverable. However, a plaintiff should
not be denied all recovery solely because the disclosure was not suffi-
ciently public.
In the instant situation, disclosure of arrest records by law enforce-
ment agencies in contravention of either an express or a necessarily im-
plied confidentiality provision constitutes an invasion of privacy which
is an actionable tort. In this setting, such a formulation is a logical ex-
pansion of the privacy doctrine, and is necessary for the vindication of
substantial individual rights. This cause of action would present a valu-
able deterrent to disclosure and thereby aid in halting discrimination
based upon arrest records.
B. Due Process
Very early in this country's legal history, a distinction was made
between the relationship of the Constitution to the government qua govern-
ment and the government qua employer. It was this distinction which
statutory duty imposed upon the defendant. Such cases have led to the so-called
"negligence per se" doctrine. See, e.g., Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 126 N.E. 814(1920) ; Phoenix Ref. Co. v. Powell, 251 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. 1952).
99. 224 Ind. 364, 66 N.E.2d 755 (1946), approved on later appeal after retrial,
225 Ind. 360, 74 N.E.2d 914, appeal dismissed, 333 U.S. 834, reh. denied, 333 U.S.
858 (1948).
100. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 47-846 et seq. (1945).
101. 224 Ind. at 381, 66 N.E.2d at 762 (emphasis added).
102. 137 N.J. Eq. 24, 43 A.2d 514 (1945), aff'd, 137 N.J. Eq. 548, 48 A.2d 842(1946).
103. Id. at 46, 43 A.2d at 525.
104. Id.
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led to the often quoted statement by Mr. Justice Holmes that "'[t]he
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no
constitutional right to be a policeman."10 5 This distinction between the
government in its governmental interests and the government in its
proprietary interests gave rise to the so-called "right-privilege" distinc-
tion in public employment. 10 6 This distinction has had an effect on public
employment that is difficult to imagine. Repeatedly, courts have dismissed
complaints by public employees who had been summarily dismissed for
any number of reasons. 10 7
It was only recently that the tide turned, hastening the demise in
importance and consequence of the "right-privilege" concept.10 8 This
downfall, due in large part to Mr. Justice Douglas' incessant attacks, 09
had led Mr. Justice Jackson to conclude that:
The fact that one may not have a legal right to get or keep a govern-
ment post does not mean that he can be adjudged ineligible illegally." 0
Consonant with this trend has been the courts' growing realization that
the government is bound by the Constitution whether it acts in a govern-
mental or proprietary capacity."' One constitutional mandate which the
courts have been expanding is the due process clause of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments.
In its early stages, the notion that the government must conform to
due process requirements in its capacity as an employer was rarely given
105. McAuliffe v. Mayor & Bd. of Aldermen, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517,
517 (1892).
106. See, e.g., Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by an
equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951). Basically, the phrase "right-privilege
distinction" summarizes the proposition that the government is not bound by the
Constitution when it acts in proprietary matters. Rather, it is free of all constitu-
tional restraints and may act as any other private entity. To the employee, this
has meant that he may be hired and fired at the whim and will of the government,
without any constitutional protection.
107. See Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Con-
stitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968) ; Note, Dismissal of Federal Em-
ployees - The Emerging Judicial Role, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 719 (1966).
108. See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Green v.
McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1958); Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551(1956); Weiman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) ; Dixon v. Alabama State Bd.
of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961); Kelly v.
Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254, 262 (1970), wherein the Court struck down the right-privilege distinction in
another setting. There, the Court held that a due process challenge to a state's
procedure for withdrawal of welfare benefits could not be rebutted by the argument
that public assistance is a privilege and not a right.
109. See, e.g., Thorp v. Housing Authority, 386 U.S. 670, 678 (1967) (Douglas,
J., concurring) ; Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 899 (1961)
(dissenting opinion) ; United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 115-22 (1947)(Douglas, J., dissenting). See also Linde, Justice Douglas on Freedom in the
Welfare State, Constitutional Rights In The Public Sector, 39 WAsH. L. REv. 4
(1964); Van Alstyne, The Constitutional Rights of Public Employees: A Comment
on the Inappropriate Uses of an Old Analogy, 16 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 751 (1969).
110. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 185 (1951)
(concurring opinion).
111. See cases cited in notes 113 to 120 infra.
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independent acknowledgement.1 1 2 However, the more recent cases have
not been reluctant to do so," 3 and have indicated that certain aspects of
procedural due process must be met before the government may dis-
charge an employee. At present, these requirements include at least:
(1) notice of the discharge and the reasons11 4 therefore;115 (2) pro-
vision for some means by which the employee may answer the chargesn1 6
(not necessarily a full scale hearing in every case" 7 ) ; (3) ample time
within which to answer;118 and, (4) a reasonable relation between the
nature of the charges and the ability of the employee to perform his
duties. 119 Finally, while most of these cases have involved the discharge
of employees, there are cases which have applied these principles to
prospective employees as well.
In the case of Scott v. Macy,120 the court allowed an appeal by a peti-
tioner who had been denied employment by the United States Civil Service
Commission because of unspecified "immoral" conduct. 12 1 The court
stated that even though the appellant was a mere applicant, "he is not
without constitutional protection."'1 22 It was held that without more
specificity, the charge of "immoral" conduct 23 was not sufficient to justify
exclusion in light of the due process clause. 1 24 Furthermore, the court
pointed out that specificity alone would not necessarily rectify the con-
stitutional infirmity of the practice since due process required that the
Commission show a reasonable relation between the petitioner's conduct
and his occupational competence.125
The Scott case is not alone in extending the due process require-
ments to applicants for employment. In McConnell v. Anderson,'1 26 the
court held that the fourteenth amendment due process clause prohibits a
state university from refusing to hire an otherwise qualified librarian
solely on the basis of the applicant's homosexuality. 2 7 The court could
112. See Van Alstyne, supra note 107. Cf. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v.McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 138 n.ll (1951).
113. Cf. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Green v. McElroy,
360 U.S. 474 (1958); Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Scott v.
Macy, 349 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
114. The reasons given must be explicit enough to enable an answer to be formu-
lated. Scott v. Macy, 349 F.2d 182, 185 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
115. Id. at 185; Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 116 (D.C. Cir. 1969) ; Olson v. Regents
of Univ. of Minn., 301 F. Supp. 1356 (D. Minn. 1969).
116. See Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See also Olson v.
Regents of Univ. of Minn., 301 F. Supp. 1356 (D. Minn. 1969).
117. Olson v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 301 F. Supp. 1356 (D. Minn. 1969).
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) ; Scott v. Macy, 349 F.2d
182 (D.C. Cir. 1965) ; cf. Green v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959) ; Cole v. Young,
351 U.S. 536 (1956).
120. 349 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
121. Id. at 184.
122. Id. at 183-84 (footnotes omitted).
123. Allegedly, the Commission based its finding of "immoral conduct" on in-
substantiated charges of homosexuality, but it did not elaborate.
124. 349 F.2d at 184-85.
125. Id. at 185. See also note 119 supra.
126. 316 F. Supp. 809 (D. Minn. 1970).
127. Id.
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not find, and the university could not show, that homosexuality adversely
affected the applicant's occupational ability.128 In McConnell, as in Scott,
the court again required the government to show a reasonable relationship
between the job and the reason for disqualification in order to meet the
due process requirements.
These cases extend constitutional protection to persons denied govern-
mental employment, as well as to those wrongfully dismissed from
employment. In so doing, they are in line with the recent trend of
expanding the constitutional restraints on the government qua employer,
and can be expected to be followed.' 29 All that remains is to apply these
principles to an individual who is excluded from public employment
because of an arrest record.
Assuming that the other procedural safeguards have been complied
with, the key determination turns upon the applicant's occupational ability
and an arrest record's relation thereto. In the great majority of cases,
it would not be reasonable to infer that a mere arrest is indicative of the
applicant's capabilities, since in the Anglo-American tradition we presume
a man innocent of a crime until proved guilty. It might be said that the
presumption of innocence applies only in criminal cases because of the
gravity of the proceedings. However, it is difficult to demonstrate why
in a criminal proceeding a presumption as to guilt cannot arise simply
because of an arrest, yet in an agency proceeding such an inference
would be permissible. In fact, it may be that any inference drawn from
an arrest record violates due process. 8 0 Therefore, any inference with
respect to the applicant's competence which is derived from an arrest
record and used as the basis for the denial of governmental employment
would violate the due process clause of either the fifth or fourteenth
amendment.
It is submitted that a case by case analysis, rather than a strictly
doctrinal approach, should be adopted by the courts in this delicate area.
In each case, the court must decide, on the basis of all the facts presented,
whether the agency acted reasonably and without arbitrariness in reaching
its conclusion to deny employment.
C. Civil Rights Act of 1871
The Civil Rights Act of 1871 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
128. Id. at 814.
129. See Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
130. In the Anglo-American legal system, the presumption of innocence is a
fundamental concept. See Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S. 456 (1961); Irvin v.
Doud, 366 U.S. 717, 729 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Coffin v. United
States, 156 U.S 432, 453 (1895). As such, it may be worthy of independent consti-
tutional protection. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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the person injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.131
Remedies arising under this Act are limited to deprivations by states
or territories or their agents of rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the United States Constitution and federal laws. As such, this section
would not be pertinent to discrimination on the federal level.
Although they are phrased broadly, in many instances, the Civil
Rights Acts have been limited by the doctrine of immunity. Legislators
have been held immune from suit under the Act,182 as have judges. 183
However, at the administrative level the defense of immunity has not been
so successful.
In cases where the defense of immunity was asserted by administra-
tive officials, the courts have distinguished two situations. When the
administrative official has been following a judicial or legislative mandate,
valid on its face, he apparently is clothed with judicial immunity." 4
However, when the official is acting pursuant to an unconstitutional
statute or custom, the defense of immunity does not apply.13 5 In the
present context, a suit against an administrative official for his imple-
mentation of a state practice or custom of discrimination in employment
based upon arrest records, would appear to have little trouble with the
immunity defense; such practice is unconstitutional as violative of the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Recent court decisions have increased the utility of section 1983. In
Monroe v. Pape,3 6 the Supreme Court held that actions by police officers
clearly in violation of state law were within the purview of that section,
notwithstanding the "under color of" state law requirement. 187  Subse-
quently, other cases have indicated that failure to exhaust state remedies
does not bar a federal action pursuant to section 1983.138 An action
under this section is made out when the plaintiff shows that the defendant
acted "under color of" state law to deprive him of "any rights, privileges
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws."' 3 9
In the present context, an action would lie against an administrative
official applying discriminatory policy. 140  Since government employment
131. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
132. See, e.g., Tenny v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
133. See, e.g., Francis v. Crafts, 203 F.2d 809 (1st Cir. 1953).
134. See, e.g., Dunn v. Gazzola, 216 F.2d 709 (lst Cir. 1954) ; Francis v. Lyman,
216 F.2d 583 (lst Cir. 1954).
135. See, e.g., Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) ; Myers v. Anderson, 238
U.S. 368 (1915).
136. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
137. Id. at 183-87.
138. See, e.g., Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967). See also Comment,
Exhaustion of State Remedies Under the Civil Rights Act, 68 COLUm. L. REV. 1201(1968).
139. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
140. See Niles, Civil Actions For Damages Under the Federal Civil RightsStatutes, 45 TEXAS L. REV. 1015 (1967); Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v.
Pape and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U.L. REV. 277 (1965); Note, The Civil
Rights Act of 1871: Continuing Vitality, 40 NOTRE DAME LAW. 70 (1969).
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is involved, and the official is a government employee, he would be acting
"under color of" state law in refusing to hire an individual with an arrest
record. Such a refusal is in violation of due process,141 and the practice
of releasing arrest records to employers may violate equal protection. 42
Therefore, the individual denied employment would be deprived of rights
secured by the Constitution. Furthermore, it should be noted that this
potential action against the responsible officials may very well have the
effect of deterring future abuses by punishing the person implementing
the discriminatory practice.
III. THE PRIVATE SECTOR
As has been previously discussed, the impact of an arrest record on
an individual's chances for public employment is great. 43  However, in
many ways the practices of private employers are more blatantly discrimi-
natory. Often, the mere presence of an arrest record completely excludes
an individual from employment. One survey of New York employment
agencies indicated that seventy-five per cent refuse to refer an individual
with an arrest record, regardless of the disposition of the case. 144 In
effect, an arrest record is treated as a conviction record by private em-
ployers.1 45 The overwhelming indication is that it is almost impossible
for a person with an arrest record to obtain a position for which he is
qualified, and not much easier for him to find employment requiring a
lower level of skill.146 This problem is greatly compounded by an almost
total lack of private remedies available to the individual. In fact, except
for an action against the law enforcement official for disclosure147 (and
the resultant deterrence of future disclosures), there does not appear to
be any single general remedy. There is, however, a remedy which may
be useful to a large segment of the population with arrest records148 - an
action brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.14 9
141. See text accompanying notes 105 to 130 supra.
142. See text accompanying notes 68 to 74 supra.
143. See notes 11 to 24 and accompanying text supra.
144. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE REPORT: THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 75 (1967).
145. See Schwartz & Skolnick, supra note 8.
146. See notes 144 & 145 supra. See also AMERICAN MANAGEMENT ASS'N BOOK
OF EMPLOYMENT FORMS 167-274 (1967); CALIPORNIA ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMM.
ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1959-61 REPORT 57 (1961); REPORT OF THE COMM. TO
INVESTIGATE THE EFFECT OF POLICE ARREST RECORDS ON EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES
IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (1967) ; Hess & LePoole, supra note 5.
147. See notes 57 to 104 and accompanying text supra.
148. Blacks make up approximately eleven per cent of the total United States
population. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES: 1970, at 23 (91st ed.). In an area encompassing 133,028,000 persons, a total
of 5,576,705 arrests were reported in 1969. Of that total, blacks accounted for 1,558,740,
or 28 per cent, while whites constituted 3,842,895, or 68.9 per cent. Reduced further,
blacks accounted for 55.7 per cent of violent crime arrests and 33.5 per cent of the
property crime arrests. CRIME REPORTS, supra note 1, at 118 (1969).
149. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1970). Section 2000e-2 provides in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compen-
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In Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc.,5 0 the United States District
Court for the Central District of California held that an objectively neutral
employment practice which discriminated against blacks, and which was
not supported by a showing of "business necessity," violated Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, irrespective of the presence or absence
of an intent to discriminate. The case is interesting and pertinent here
because the neutral practice was the disqualification from employment of
anyone who had been arrested on a "number of occasions."'' The court
noted that while Negroes comprise only eleven per cent of the population,
they account for twenty-seven per cent of reported arrests with forty-five
per cent of those arrests characterized as "suspicious." In enjoining
Litton Systems, the court found the defendant's policy violative of Title
VII because it
has the foreseeable effect of denying black applicants an equal oppor-
tunity for employment. It is unlawful even if it appears, on its face,
to be racially neutral, . . . [G]ood faith in the . . . application of
the policy is not a defense.'5 2
While decided in the midst of a conflict among the circuit courts as
to the legality of so-called "neutral" practices,15 the Gregory case stands
for the position that irrespective of the practice's neutrality, it is illegal
if it does in fact discriminate. This position is similar to that taken by
the United States Supreme Court in Gaston County v. United States,154
striking down the use of voter literacy tests as constituting a subtle form
of discrimination against blacks. Ostensibly "neutral," the policy was in
fact discriminatory since blacks had traditionally been denied educational
opportunity and, therefore, proportionally fewer were able to pass the
literacy test.
The dispute as to "neutral" policies in racial discrimination cases has
finally been put to rest by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power
sation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportuni-
ties or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.(b) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employment agency
to fail or refuse to refer for employment, or otherwise to discriminate
against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin, or to classify or refer for employment any individual on the basis
of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
150. 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
151. 316 F. Supp. at 402.
152. Id. at 403.
153. Compare Papermakers Local 189 v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970), and Asbestos Workers Local 53 v. Vogler,
407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969), with Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225 (4th
Cir. 1970), rev'd, 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and Broussard v. Schlumberger Well Servs,
315 F. Supp. 506 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
154. 395 U.S. 285 (1969).
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Co.155 In Griggs, the Court held that the neutral practice of requiring a
high school education or the passing of a general intelligence test as a
condition to employment in or transfer to jobs was invalid under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.156 The practice was held invalid
because: (1) while it was applied uniformly to whites and blacks alike,
it operated to exclude blacks at a higher rate than whites; (2) the practice
was not shown to be significantly related to job performance; and (3)
the practice substantially carried on the previous policy of giving prefer-
ence to whites. 157 This last reason, however, was not relied upon heavily
since the Court accepted the lower court's determination that there was,
in fact, no motive or intent to discriminate.158 The Court stated that
"Congress directed . . . the Act to the consequences of employment
practices, not simply the motivation.' 5 9
As Griggs amply illustrates, the district court in Gregory was correct
in invalidating the company's policy of excluding persons with multiple
arrest records, since the policy acted to exclude blacks at a higher rate
than whites, and there was no showing, by the company, that the practice
was significantly related to job performance. With the backing of the
Griggs case, Gregory becomes an invaluable precedent in invalidating
the neutral practice of private job disqualification because of arrest records.
IV. CONCLUSION
The imposition placed upon many members of society by the mainte-
nance and retention of arrest records is overwhelming. While the rights
of the individual must yield to the interests of society at the time of
arrest, it is difficult to justify his continued hardship on the same basis.
In their peculiarly characteristic lethargy, the legislatures, both state and
federal, either have taken no action, or have given insufficient protection
to the privacy and dignity of their citizens. 160 It is, therefore, the position
of this Comment that it must become a task for the courts to rectify the
problem. Furthermore, a substantial benefit is derived from allowing
private remedies in areas such as this because of their deterrent value.
Surely, an administrative official would be more hesitant to discriminate
knowing that any resultant damages will come out of his own pocket.
With this in mind, several of the more attractive available alternatives
have been presented; it is hoped for the benefit of the courts as well as
for the benefit of the individual litigant.
Baldo M. Carnecchia, Jr.
155. 401 U.S. 424 (1971), noted in 17 VILL. L. REV. 147 (1971).
156. Id. at 436.
157. Id. at 426.
158. Id. at 432.
159. Id.
160. See notes 57 to 62 supra.
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